Sunday, August 31, 2014

Mass Customization…A Lean and Agile Supply Chain Required

When we think of becoming Lean, in many ways, the ultimate process strategy to accomplish this is what is known as “Mass Customization”. This refers to production in batch sizes of one to meet customer specific demand. Mass customization combines the low unit costs of mass production processes with the flexibility of individual customization.
Not too many manufacturers have reached this point yet, although some are headed in that direction (see “Mass customization - Combining elements of mass production with those of bespoke tailoring”).
Examples of the successful execution of mass customization include:
Levi Strauss, an early innovator using the concept in 1994 with its “Original Spin” jeans for women, which leveraged technology to measure customers in its stores and send their details electronically to its factory.
Dell Computers, whose customers design their personal computers online. After that, Dell assembles, tests and ships them as requested at the last minute before delivery (a good example of the use of the concept of “postponement”).
Ford Motor Company allows customers to build a vehicle from a palette of options online and BMW claims that no two of its new cars are identical.
As the concept of mass customization effectively postpones the task of differentiating a product for a specific customer until the latest possible point in the supply network, it can put a lot of stress on one’s supply chain. Thus the need for both your manufacturing and supply chain processes to be Lean and agile.
I write a lot on this blog and elsewhere about Lean supply chain, where there is an ongoing focus on the identification and elimination of waste from the customer’s view. To be successful, this requires efficiency as well as integration and collaboration with customers and suppliers.
However, in order to successfully execute a mass customization strategy, the supply chain needs to also be very agile; meaning that it must be designed to be flexible and fast when dealing with “unique” products with unpredictable demand.
So, not surprisingly, that’s where the idea of having a “hybrid” strategy comes into play. A hybrid supply chain strategy is a combination of lean and agile concepts, where a manufacturer operates with flexible production capacity that can meet surges in demand along with a postponement strategy, where products are partially assembled to a forecast and then completed to the actual order when and even where it arrives.
In the end, your supply chain strategy (and capabilities) must support your organization's overall strategy and typically, in today’s world, that means being lean and agile.

Saturday, August 30, 2014

Court Finds FedEx Ground Drivers Are Employees and Not Independent Contractors

FedEx could be liable for hundreds of millions of dollars 

in drivers’ operating expenses and wages. By 24/7 Staff


Today, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal ruled that a class of 2,300 individuals
working for FedEx Ground was misclassified as independent contractors
instead of employees.
As a result, FedEx may owe its workforce of drivers hundreds of millions of
dollars for illegally shifting to them the costs of such things as the FedEx
branded trucks, FedEx branded uniforms, and FedEx scanners, as well as
missed meal and rest period pay, overtime compensation, and penalties.
The case, known as Alexander v. FedEx Ground, covers employees in
California from 2000 - 2007. The ruling can be found on the Leonard Carder
website at leonardcarder.com.
Judge Fletcher’s majority opinion was very clear on the question of whether
these workers are employees or independent contractors, stating “We hold
that plaintiffs are employees as a matter of law under California’s right-to-
control test.”
The court’s decision is the most recent in a series of cases that have
methodically proven that FedEx Ground’s independent contractor model
is built on the legal fiction that its drivers are in business for themselves.
The Ninth Circuit decisively rejected that claim.
The court’s finding in Alexander that drivers in California are covered by
California’s workplace protection statutes not only impacts one of FedEx
Ground’s largest workforces but could influence the outcome in over two
dozen cases nationwide in which FedEx Ground drivers are challenging the
legality of their independent contractor classification.
Millions of packages are delivered every day across the state under the control, direction, and supervision of FedEx Ground. In addition, many trucking companies have been operating under a similar model in which they classify their drivers as independent contractors.
“FedEx Ground built its business on the backs of individuals it labelled as independent contractors, promising them the entrepreneurial American Dream,” said Leonard Carder Attorney Beth A. Ross who is a national leader on cases covering the exploitation of workers by mischaracterizing them as independent contractors. “However, as Judge Trott said in his concurring opinion, not all that glitters is gold.”
FedEx now requires its so-called contractors in California to hire a secondary workforce of FedEx drivers, who do the same work as the plaintiffs under the same contract. The Alexander decision calls into question FedEx’s strategy of making plaintiffs the middle men between the secondary workforce of drivers and FedEx.
“We have heard of many instances where the secondary drivers are
earning such low wages that they have to rely on public assistance to
make ends meet,” said Ross.
Background on the everyday experience for FedEx Ground drivers includes:
  • FedEx Ground drivers were required to pay out of out of pocket for everything from the FedEx Ground branded trucks they drove (painted with the FedEx Ground logo) to fuel, various forms of insurance, tires, oil changes, maintenance, etc. as well as their uniforms, scanners and even workers compensation coverage.
  • In some cases workers were required to pay the wages of employees who FedEx Ground required them to hire to cover for them if they were sick or needed a vacation, to help out during the Christmas rush, and in some cases to drive other FedEx Ground trucks.
  • After paying these expenses, a typical FedEx driver makes less than employee drivers at FedEx Ground’s competitors like UPS, and receives none of the employee benefits, like health care, workers compensation, paid sick leave and vacation, and retirement.
  • In addition, their employment was subject to the whims of FedEx management and FedEx Ground’s decisions on staffing and routes left the employee drivers stuck with expensive long-term truck leases on FedEx branded trucks.
The drivers’ attorney Beth Ross added, “Nationally, thousands of FedEx
Ground drivers must pay for the privilege of working for FedEx 55 hours a
week, 52 weeks a year. Today, these workers were granted rights and
benefits entitled to employees under California law.
To be clear, the Ninth Circuit exposed FedEx Ground’s independent
contractor model as unlawful.”
Among the noteworthy elements to emerge from the litigation, FedEx
Ground’s practices take advantage of workers and are anti-competitive.
FedEx Ground’s so-called “contractors” do the same work as UPS and
U.S. Postal Service drivers for substantially less pay and without benefits.
This plays out in two distinct ways. FedEx Ground saves money and harms
drivers and the public by avoiding employment taxes and workers’
compensation insurance, and complying with all other workplace protections.
Ross added, “This ruling will have seismic impact on this industry and the
lives of FedEx Ground drivers in California.”
FedEx Ground Loses New Legal Round With Labor
Patrick Burnson - Logistics Management
The court maintains that independent contractors operating in California
from 2000-2007 and Oregon from 1999-2009 were employees according
to the panel’s interpretation of state laws.
“We fundamentally disagree with these rulings, which run counter to more
than 100 state and federal findings – including the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit – upholding our contractual relationships with thousands of
independent businesses,” said FedEx Ground Senior Vice President and
General Counsel Cary Blancett. “The operating agreement on which these
rulings are based has been significantly strengthened in recent years, and
we look forward to continuing to work with service providers across our
network to provide customers the industry’s most reliable service.”
The court held that those independent contractors operating in California
from 2000-2007 and Oregon from 1999-2009 were employees according
to the panel’s interpretation of state laws. The model that the court reviewed
is no longer in use. Since 2011, FedEx Ground has only contracted with
incorporated businesses, which treat their drivers as their employees.
FedEx Ground will seek review of these decisions, including review by
the entire Ninth Circuit.
Jerry Hempstead, president of Hempstead Consulting, said he expects
FedEx to be put up big fight.
“It’s too expensive for them not to oppose this,” he said in an interview.
“All the appeals have yet to run out, and I can see this remaining in the
legal system for some time yet.”
In light of legal and regulatory developments in several states, FedEx
Ground has taken a number of steps in recent years to enhance its
operating agreements with the independent businesses that contract
with the company to provide transportation services.
Company spokesmen said that as the latest step in this ongoing effort,
FedEx Ground will transition to new independent service provider (ISP)
agreements in the states of California, Oregon, Washington, and Nevada.
Currently, FedEx Ground contracts with more than 550 businesses that
provide pickup and delivery service in California. Those businesses
averaged nearly $500,000 in revenue last year, with nearly 50 of them
topping $1 million or more in earnings.
“Small businesses are the foundation and growth engine of the U.S.
economy, and we are proud of our long-standing contractual relationship
with these service providers – each of which agrees to treat their personnel
as employees and to comply with all applicable federal and state laws,”
said FedEx Ground Vice President of Contractor Relations Sean O’Connor. “We remain committed to maintaining a business model that has been proven
successful for our customers, service providers, and shareowners.”

Convergence is the word

Third-party logistics providers (3PLs) are transforming themselves into businesses that provide a diverse array of services well beyond logistics.
If i had to describe the state of the third-party logistics (3PL) industry in one word, it would be convergence. Convergence refers to the merging of distinct technologies, industries, or devices into a unified whole. And that is exactly what is happening in this industry on two fronts.
The first involves the convergence of fragmented logistics services with integrated logistics solutions. This has been happening for many years, primarily via mergers and acquisitions. It is a path toward fulfilling the traditional definition (and promise) of a 3PL. Here is the Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals' definition:
Article Figures
[Figure 1] Third-party logistics net revenues by segment
[Figure 1] Third-party logistics net revenues by segmentEnlarge this image
A firm that provides multiple logistics services for use by customers. Preferably, these services are integrated, or "bundled" together by the provider. These firms facilitate the movement of parts and materials from suppliers to manufacturers, and finished products from manufacturers to distributors and retailers. Among the services they provide are transportation, warehousing, cross-docking, inventory management, packaging, and freight forwarding.
This convergence of services and broader solutions has also led logistics service providers to drive new growth by expanding globally to support clients across different geographic regions and by targeting new vertical industries, such as health care and energy. Here are just a few examples of this type of expansion from the first half of 2014, in the form of headlines from press releases:
  • Transplace and Celtic Expand Intermodal Services in Mexico
  • XPO Logistics Completes Acquisition of Pacer International
  • Menlo Launches Freight Brokerage Service in Europe
  • Coyote Logistics and Access America Transport to Merge
  • UPS Continues Global Healthcare Expansion with Purchase of UK Healthcare Logistics Innovator
The trend toward the convergence of logistics services, coupled with the trend toward geographic and vertical industry expansion, will certainly continue in the months and years ahead as 3PLs fend off the risk of commoditization by positioning themselves as one-stop-shops or end-to-end solution providers. (Figure 1 shows the growth pattern for some of the major 3PL service segments.)
But there's another convergence taking place in the market, one that's driven by the changing needs and expectations of customers. This second convergence is transforming the very definition and value proposition of 3PLs. What we are seeing is the convergence of business models, specifically the business models of service providers, technology companies, and consulting firms.
There already are examples of logistics service providers offering their own software-as-a-service applications (C.H. Robinson and Transplace, to name two), and some consulting firms and software vendors are providing managed services (enVista, Transportation Insight, and LeanLogistics, for example). But that was just the beginning. In recent months, Amazon has embedded itself in Procter & Gamble (P&G) warehouses to fulfill online orders. Google has invested in its own fleet of vehicles to provide delivery services to consumers. And Uber has launched UberRUSH, a local delivery service that lets consumers use a mobile app to arrange for foot or bicycle messengers to pick up and deliver items weighing 30 pounds or less.
Simply put, the traditional definition of a third-party logistics provider is stale and limiting. It's becoming more outmoded every day as innovations in technology and business models continue to transform the competitive landscape. Logistics service providers that focus solely on the convergence of services and ignore the convergence of business models will, at best, limit their growth potential, and at worst, cease to exist.
What business are you in?
What business are you in? That's a question every 3PL needs to ask itself today. As Anthony J. Tjan, chief executive officer and founder of the venture capital firm Cue Ball, wrote in a Harvard Business Review blog post titled "The First Strategic Question Every Business Must Ask," "It seems like a straightforward question, and one that should take no time to answer. But the truth is that most company leaders are too narrow in defining their competitive landscape or market space. They fail to see the potential for 'non-traditional' competitors, and therefore often misperceive their basic business definition and future market space."
That will likely sound familiar to many 3PL executives. But others are following the convergence path, not just providing customers with integrated logistics services like transportation management and warehousing, but also offering technology and business management services.
Some 3PLs, for example, provide software applications, trading partner connectivity, and data-quality management services that provide customers with timely, accurate, and complete visibility to supply chain events, information, and intelligence. Others provide thought leadership and advice, giving their customers new ideas that will help them make smarter and faster decisions about their supply chain networks, strategy, and practices. Some have risk management capabilities to help customers minimize or eliminate supply chain risks and, more importantly, to help them recover from supply chain disruptions more quickly and with less impact.
There are 3PLs that provide all of those things, yet most don't view themselves from those perspectives. But perhaps they should, because all of those services represent opportunities to differentiate themselves from the competition.
Focus on outcomes
What does this all mean for manufacturers and retailers looking for a logistics solution provider?
The first step remains the same: They have to clearly define their desired outcomes. But when it comes to finding the right partner to help them reach those objectives, they need to take a fresh look at the market—beyond the traditional labels of 3PL, software vendor, and consultant. The reality is that manufacturers and retailers have a diversity of options today, and regardless of how it may be labeled, the best outsourcing partner is the one that can provide the right mix of technology, services, and advice to help customers achieve their desired outcomes.
Manufacturers and retailers also have to recognize that the traditional way of managing 3PL relationships—viewing them as suppliers, with short-term agreements that are focused on providing the lowest-cost solution—is also becoming stale and limiting. To reach higher levels of performance and benefits, manufacturers and retailers need to start engaging in true collaboration and exploring vested relationships with their partners. ("Vested," a business model and methodology developed by the University of Tennessee, refers to outsourcing relationships that reward both partners for achieving mutually beneficial outcomes.)
And that would be the ultimate manifestation of convergence: 3PLs and customers developing a joint business plan and shared vision statement that align with the objectives and desired outcomes of the end customers,which in many cases are consumers like you and me.
dave biegger headshot
Over the course of the last two years, we at Supply Chain Insights have worked on a methodology to gauge supply chain improvement. We named it the Supply Chain Index. We have found that supply chain metrics are gnarly and complicated. During the last two months, we have been interviewing supply chain leaders to get their views on the methodology.
We believe that a supply chain leader is defined by both the level of performance on the Effective Frontier (balance of growth, Return on Invested Capital, Profitability and Inventory Turns) and driving supply chain improvement. We think that it requires a focus on both total performance and measured supply chain improvement. We also believe that it needs to be based upon their peer group. Supply Chain Excellence as defined by a methodology where all companies are put into a spreadsheet and compared across industries is meaningless.
In this blog, we share an interview with Dave Biegger, SVP of Campbell Soup. Dave will be speaking on his journey along with other supply chain leaders at the Supply Chain Insights Global Summit in Scottsdale, Arizona on September 10th and 11th These interviews of supply chain leaders will be collated into our fourth book on supply chain excellence which will publish at our conference in September 2015.
Background on the Supply Chain Index
During the period of 2006-2012, Campbell Soup Company outperformed its peer group on the Supply Chain Index. The Index is a methodology developed by Supply Chain Insights LLC, in cooperation with the Operations Research Team at Arizona State University (ASU), to gauge supply chain improvement. In the Index, corporate progress is calculated on balance, strength and resiliency improvements. The balance factor tracks progress on both year-over-year growth and Return on Invested Capital (ROIC), and the strength factor is based upon improvement in both operating margin and inventory turns. Resiliency is the tightness of the pattern, or the reliability of operating margin and inventory turns results. Together, the three factors form the Supply Chain Index.
The Supply Chain Index methodology is based on three principles. The first is that the supply chain is a complex system that has increasing complexity. It needs to be managed holistically as a system. The second principle is that the supply chain needs to be managed cross-functionally, end-to-end, from the customer’s customer to the supplier’s supplier; and as such, it cannot be viewed as just another function. The third principle is that the supply chain is a significant contributor to corporate performance, and that supply chain improvement can be tracked and measured based upon public financial statements.
Figure 1. Food and Beverage Company Performance on the Supply Chain Index for the Period of 2006-2012
On July 24th, I interviewed the Campbell team –under the leadership of Dave Biegger, SVP of Global Supply Chain, to gain insights on the Index, and their journey. Dave joined Campbell Soup Company in 2005 after a 24-year career in product supply at Procter & Gamble.  Dave asked his team to join him for the discussion. Here are the notes from that discussion:
What has Campbell done to demonstrate such strong performance over the last 6-year measured period?
Eight years ago, we started with a focus on Total Delivered Cost (TDC) and elevating our cost savings program performance, as well as eliminating sub-optimized cost efforts that might have helped in one specific area, but hurt our overall performance. We took a holistic approach to accomplish this goal by developing training programs and tools to ensure that all employees had an accurate picture of total cost and how to drive improvements. We built these into continuous improvement programs such as Lean Six Sigma, while also setting goals to drive breakthrough cost savings to supplement continuous improvement savings.
I strongly believe diversity of experience and thought leads to improved performance. This is why our next step was focused on building an effective supply chain team by developing people and leveraging their talent. We wanted to create the best mix of people with the right skills and experiences and put them into the right positions. The key was to build upon the tremendous experience that already existed within Campbell, as well as attract great talent from other world-class companies and supply chain organizations. That blend has been key in helping us to make significant improvements.
Any time you make a significant change or improvement, it’s essential to understand the culture of your organization when developing an approach. At the beginning of this journey, we tended to behave more in silos in parts of the company, both across the plant network and across functions. This obviously made it more challenging to implement new concepts in a standardized way and to reapply great solutions.  It became clear at the time that starting small with pilots to prove concepts was an important way to build support and alignment at Campbell. We began with a focus on operational reliability; making products right the first time with no waste in a reliable manner. We needed to ensure that we had a strong and predictable base capability to build upon. This work was organized under an Operations Excellence program, a pillared approach supported with clear leadership and matrix teams.  Our next focus was to introduce produce-to-demand as an operating strategy, or the implementation of demand-driven concepts. We’ve made great progress, and I am proud of how well the organization now works together through improved communication and shared resources. We simplified our SC strategy and communicated in a straightforward, one-page document that laid out primary goal areas.  Our intention was to maintain constancy of purpose and continuity. These strategy areas remain important today, while our priorities and tactics evolve as we make progress.
How did you approach your cost savings program?
As with all supply chain organizations, when we focus on big cost opportunities, we normally deliver savings in those areas. But we created a model to ensure that we were systemic and structured in how we approached cost savings. To drive the sustainable savings program at a best-in-class level, and to ensure that we could reduce costs faster than the cost of inflation, we implemented specific standards. In our program, cost avoidance, while desirable, does not count towards the metric. In addition, a one-time cost savings does not count either. As a team, we agreed to count only recurring savings that offset inflation. Our aim was to maintain a 3 to 3.5 percent savings as a percent of year-over-year total deliver costs. We set a goal that 50% of our target would come from continuous improvement and the other half would come from breakthrough innovation and thinking. We’ve developed a clear model with specific accountabilities to ensure success in delivering strong cost savings performance year after year. Our approach simply breaks accountabilities and goals across the areas of Manufacturing, Logistics/Network Optimization and Ingredients/Packaging.
What have you learned?
It’s important to recognize the interdependencies of capabilities and programs. Each focus area alone is important and can bring great value; but, if key focus areas and programs are managed together holistically versus independently, the opportunity becomes much greater. Campbell’s programs included Operations Excellence to build a strong base, Network Optimization, Product and Process Simplification, Visibility/Orchestration of the SC network (including S&OP), and implementing an Operating Strategy consistent with Demand-Driven Supply Network capabilities. As we improve in each of these areas, we also open up opportunities in the remaining areas.
As we became more efficient with our assets and began building more flexibility into our plants, we improved cost and service results, along with creating an opportunity to streamline operations, which fell under our Network Optimization program. This has led to almost a 50% reduction in the number of plants across Campbell’s global footprint, and although each decision has been difficult, the cost impact has been significant and important.
Through our common platform/postponement initiative, we simplified product designs by eliminating non-value-added flavors or ingredient dice sizes. This also improved the consistency of our product quality, reduced costs and inventory, and enabled improved reliability through the resulting simplified process. This is challenging work because it is highly dependent on cross-functional collaboration. We would not have succeeded without a team effort across R&D, the business leaders, and SC disciplines of engineering, procurement, and manufacturing. This dedicated team of 20, a majority being R&D resources, was self-funded due to its ability to quickly drive savings. Most important about this effort was that we were clear on our principles that quality was more important to us than cost. This meant that every change we made had to result in equal or better quality at equal or lower cost.
In addition to quality, we’ve created capabilities that will support improved customer solutions and enable growth for the business. Flexibility is not just about asset rationalization, but also about unleashing growth in different product formats, packaging sizes, etc. It’s not just flexibility within the line, but across the entire production system. After five years, we’ve nearly completed implementation of our simplification effort, Soup Common Platform, which consisted of three phases:
  1. Start with formula (recipe) simplification.
  2. Focus on process simplification (We were able to eliminate unnecessary processes, which not only made it easier and more cost effective to make the product, but also improved quality by minimizing the impact on ingredients through the process).
  3. Equipment and plant design (Our focus was on the plant of the future. We reduced 40 percent of assets and still make the same amount of product with greater flexibility. Our final implementation of this program is happening next year).
We started these improvement efforts in the center of the supply chain with an emphasis on building manufacturing capability, reliability and flexibility. We now have the ability to focus more on materials management and suppliers upstream, and distribution and customer solutions downstream, to drive optimization. While we are nearing the end of our work on the Soup Common Platform, we continue to focus on strengthening relationships and ensuring greater cooperation with our suppliers and customers.
Were there any improvement efforts that did not go well?
One of our opportunity areas was to improve our planning processes and make the proper investment in Advanced Planning Systems. We needed to make the investment because our system was aging and we wanted to invest in a way that supported our demand-driven agenda. However, we simply attempted to do too much too fast, expecting we could quickly move ahead with integrated planning. S&OP also presented challenges, but we have since changed to a more structured approach to drive greater business ownership. While the implementation was a challenge overall, we’ve moved beyond it.
Over the last year, we focused on ensuring that our systems and tools were delivering as expected. On the S&OP side, we haven’t done anything that’s drastically different from all the textbooks. Where we’ve put particular emphasis and made a step change was in adapting the culture to have a shared understanding of how we run the business. S&OP success depends on a strong culture that supports a cross-functional process. We have a good cooperative effort and understanding from marketing, sales and supply chain on how to make decisions that ensure the success of S&OP. We continually reinforce this within our culture, as well as maintain ongoing process improvement.
Why do you think Campbell will fall on Index ratings in the future?
We had about seven consecutive years of constant improvement in our supply chain at Campbell, across virtually every result area. While I was surprised to see us at the top of the list for that period knowing there are so many strong supply chain organizations in our industry, it also matched what we had been experiencing with all of the results improvements we had delivered. Assuming the measure is generally effective at recognizing improvement, I have to assume we will fall on the list over the next few years. Some of the decline in ranking will be due to the issues I mentioned above with the planning system implementation and the impact that had on results. The bigger impact will come from a conscious choice we made. As part of our Network Optimization program, we consolidated our supply chain network in the U.S last year. While the driver for this move was excess capacity, as well as a compelling cost savings benefit, we also knew there would be a two-year hit on our inventory performance until the flexibility was created at other sites to allow the inventory levels to fall and resume the improvement trend we had been following. Finally, we all understand that margin is not fully controlled within supply chain. We have two things that have challenged margins recently at Campbell:
  1. Mix due to the addition of recently added high-growth business acquisitions that come with a lower margin rate
  2. Trade investments that will return to more historic levels in the future.
As we move past some of the challenges we had over the past year or two, and return to the inventory improvement path we had been delivering, I expect that we will see solid improvement in Index ratings.
If you had to do it all over again, what would you do differently?
We have enjoyed excellent results over most of the last several years, but there are a few things I would change if we could go back. We tried to do too much too fast. As a team, we committed to implementing demand planning and supply network planning all within the same year, followed by inventory optimization and demand sensing.  We also underestimated the organizational investment it would take to achieve our desired results. In the end, we experienced important learnings, built critical capabilities, and will now be able to generate more results improvements in the future because of that effort. More broadly, we could have been more balanced in our approach to integrating an already aggressive supply chain agenda with a rapidly increasing product innovation agenda.
Despite some of our recent challenges, we feel very good about the contributions that the supply chain team has made at Campbell for a meaningful stretch of time. Without a longer-term vision, and a willingness to take risks by embracing big opportunities and committing to big results improvements, we would have only made incremental progress. If I had to simplify what has been most important for us, I would say the two keys have been people (leadership) and an integrated approach. It’s no surprise that strong leadership and great people make the difference, especially when the organization is engaged and collaborating both within the supply chain and across all other functions. The power of an integrated approach, connecting multiple complex improvement efforts, has clearly driven much stronger results progress than we would have seen from independently driven initiatives, even if all had been successful individually.

Conclusion:

Figure 2. Supply Chain Index Rankings for 2006-2013
As we can see in Figure 2, the impact of Campbell’s aggressive supply chain projects in 2012-2013, in conjunction with some changes in the business, as Dave predicted, had a deleterious impact on Campbell’s rankings on the Supply Chain Index.
The good news is that the team was aware of the results and feel that they have righted the ship in 2014. The lessons of the team in the trials and tribulation of building supply chain excellence apply to all. It takes many years to build a culture to improve supply chain excellence, and many well-intended technology or plant design projects can quickly take a supply chain team off guard. Luckily for Campbell, this supply chain team had the right stuff to self-correct and put the supply chain back on course.
We look forward to getting your thoughts on the Supply Chain Index. To learn more, join us for our webinar on the Supply Chain Index for the Industrial Sectors of consumer electronics, automotive, automotive suppliers and semiconductor manufacturers August 12th at 11:00 EST. Additionally, at our Supply Chain Insights Global Summit on September 10th and 11th, we will publish the results for all industries for the periods of 2006-2013 and 2009-2013 in a report, The Supply Chains That We Admire. The Supply Chains That We Admire report will have a detailed analysis, by industry, on supply chain performance on operating margin, inventory turns and ROIC, along with the analysis of year-over-year improvement. It will also include some analysis of companies like Campbell Soup that are willing to share their stories.
I have found it quite exciting to look deeply at the results of all public companies over these periods and reflect back on the work that I have done with many of them over my 12 years as an analyst. I firmly believe that supply chain matters to corporate performance, and I am proud that I can now tell the story. I had a call this morning with a group of financial investors that are adopting the Supply Chain Index in their rankings, and Supply Chain Management Review in the fall will feature a monthly article on industry sector results. We look forward to connecting with you and your team as the concepts take hold.

Six Ways to Stretch Your Payment Terms

When it comes to working capital improvements, accounts payable may yield an abundant crop of low-hanging fruit.
Faced with cash calls from their banks and creditors in the wake of the financial meltdown, many companies sought to squeeze funds out of their working capital. They did so by going after customers who owed them money, cutting down on the costs associated with inventory, and increasing their days payable outstanding.
The result is that many corporate coffers are filled to bursting with cash. To some experts, that abundance has led to a certain complacency about making improvements in working capital. In 2010, following the worst year in recent memory in terms of working capital performance, nonfinancial companies merely treaded water. The three components of days working capital showed similarly sluggish levels of improvement. Days sales outstanding (DSO) declined 0.1%, while days inventory outstanding (DIO) and days payable outstanding (DPO) each improved just 1.1%, according to the 2011CFO/REL Working Capital Scorecard. (For full coverage of the scorecard’s results, see the upcoming July/August issue of CFO magazine.)
Still, there are indications that many companies are looking to better those results. With much of the low-hanging fruit of working capital improvements already picked in the wake of the financial meltdown, a good area to look for betterment is on the payment side, says Steve Riordan, global managing director of advisory services at PRGX, a working capital consultancy.

1. Let A/P chiefs drive A/P improvements.
 Companies composed of many divisions often put finance and accounting shared-services groups together to support all those units. When it comes to working capital improvements, a subgroup consisting of executives from purchasing, treasury, and payables often will run the show.Often overlooked because of the relatively low status of accounts payable in finance departments, A/P thus provides an opportunity for process and structural improvements that can enable companies to hold on to their cash longer. For companies looking to improve their DPO scores, Riordan recommends the following:
The problem at many companies, however, is that while people from all three functions are responsible for the project, “it’s not clear who’s ultimately accountable for improving working capital,” says Riordan.
When it comes to projects aimed at improving payment terms, though, it’s clear who should be in charge: the A/P director, who often reports to the controller. Sitting on mountains of data about externals (how fast vendors are being paid by the entire market and on what terms) and internals (the kind of job purchasing managers are doing in managing payables), the A/P chief is in the best spot to see where improvements need to be made.
2. CFOs or chief procurement officers should sponsor the effort. While they don’t have the time to take the day-to-day lead, executives who directly report to chief executive officers should take responsibility and “own the business case” for the project. In particular, the finance or procurement chief should be committed — and drive the company’s commitment — to a particular return on investment.
Besides the truism that corporate initiatives rarely succeed without top-management buy-in, an important reason for high-level sponsorship is that some decisions regarding payables can affect the company’s value and reputation. One of Riordan’s clients, a large supermarket chain, ran into a big problem with a vendor when the chain tried to stretch its payment terms from 21 days to 30 days. The vendor “actually went to the press and tried to insinuate that my client was having cash-flow problems and bigger issues,” he says.
Even though the company was a stable and successful retailer, “the vendor was able to cast some doubt on the company’s finances,” the consultant adds. As a result, it took the involvement of senior management on both sides to resolve the situation.
3. Build a strong alliance between finance and purchasing. While they’re not exactly rivals, finance and procurement executives have sharply different perspectives when it comes to payables. Purchasers decide what they’re going to buy and buy it. Finance and accounting folks focus on the effects of those purchases on company cash flows.
For their part, buyers don’t tend to be rewarded for getting the best payment terms and hence don’t often negotiate for them. Sensing that, crafty vendors sometimes try “to drive a wedge between finance and purchasing” by trying to convince purchasers that payables terms aren’t all that significant, Riordan observes. To get the best arrangement, the two functions need to close ranks.
4. Approach vendors differently. Setting a broad corporate payables goal and then expecting managers to achieve uniform results from vendors is “never successful,” maintains Riordan. Rather than blanketing all sellers with the same request for improved terms, A/P execs should divide vendors into different categories and then tailor the companies’ approach accordingly.
Riordan likes to divide vendors into four groups. First are the “untouchables.” Because such sellers have significantly more power than the buyer in their relationship, buyers shouldn’t even attempt to get them to change payment terms. While the second group, the “squeaky wheels,” may complain vociferously about such requests, they will in the end come to a settlement. The best way to eke out an improvement is thus to engage them in live meetings.
The third category — the “good soldiers” — will “scream and yell and make lots of noise, but in the end they’re going to do what you ask them to do,” says Riordan. Last are the “wallflowers,” who need the buyers’ business so much that they’re in no position to refuse to come to terms.
Not much thinking has to go into getting wallflowers to accept later payments. All a CFO has to do in such cases, says Riordan, is to send them a letter that begins: “Congratulations! To keep doing business with us, your new terms are….”
5. Start the bargaining from a rigorous baseline. Companies can lose money if they try to negotiate purchasing terms strictly on the basis of price, forgetting to factor in delivery costs, vendor discounts, and allowances. In negotiating longer payment terms, buyers should have a firm grasp of the effect of the purchase on their company’s adjusted gross margin — which includes such costs — rather than simply on its gross margin.
If a buyer lacks such an understanding, the seller can manipulate the deal by agreeing to stretch the payment terms but charging too much for doing so. “You’re going to lose sight of [vendors] sneaking in and sort of taking money out of one pocket and putting it in the other,” says Riordan. “If you don’t understand their total profitability, you’ll have the illusion that you’ve gotten a total improvement, but you haven’t in fact gotten [one].”
6. Pay for performance. As is the case with all efforts to improve working capital performance, payables projects suffer from a tendency on the part of companies to gauge success — and executive compensation — solely on the basis of the bottom line of the income statement. But since they tend to boost cash rather than revenues, working capital improvements tend to show up as cash assets on the balance sheet or as upticks on the cash-flow statement, rather than as profits.
The solution is to build budgets and create incentives that are based on cash. Specifically, a company can supply senior executives with “protected budgets” in which targets aren’t based on sales increases. It can also embed cash-flow-improvement targets into their bonus structures. The idea, says Riordan, is to motivate “the people who live and die every day by the income statement to help the company out and improve the cash balance.”

Why America Should Privatise Its Infrastructure


Barry Ritholtz has a nice piece today talking about how American, and American conservatives especially, should be coming around to the idea of spending more money on the nation’s infrastructure. As ever with Ritholtz though it’s a good idea to look at his information source rather than his conclusions: the first might guide you to the right path, the second quite probably won’t. For Ritholtz is quite obviously calling for more public spending on such infrastructure (his comment that it would provide needed stimulus is a clue there) when reality, and his source, actually rather argue that America should privatise said infrastructure.
His source for the idea that more should be spent on infrastructure is this report from McKinsey. And I’m quite happy to just accept everything they say about the way that the US requires both more bridges, transport links and water treatment plants. Well, not happy, but happy for the purpose of argument you understand. Which leaves us with the two important points they also make plus one that we can divine from real world experience.
The first of those is that they point to how infrastructure spending in the US is generally appallingly done. The Big Dig in Boston only cost 10 times the original estimates. This is a feature of publicly run and financed projects: a bridge in Oakland did a bit better and was only three times over budget. This is a constant feature of public projects: in my native UK the Olympics came in at well over 10x that original budget. In that case it was because the original budget offered to us taxpayers before it started was quite simply a lie. We would never have gone ahead with it if we had known the true cost therefore we weren’t told it. That’s not always the reason for these over runs but there’s obviously a definite suspicion that California’s entirely ludicrous high speed rail plan is going come in well over even its hopelessly vast budget.
The point being that government, at any and every level, is just not very good at running these large projects.
The second is that government, at any and every level, is just not very good at choosing which projects to undertake. That high speed rail in CA CA +0.36% could be used as an example a second time even though McKinsey resists that temptation. They do though point out that it’s maintenance and incremental improvements that get ignored when government runs things. To be every so slightly cynical because it’s a lot easier to gain votes as a politician when there’s a picture of you opening a new bridge than when people don’t note the absence of potholes. Thus politicians will allocate budgets to new bridges and not to the pothole elimination fund.
McKinsey does say that more money should be spent: but not in the manner that it is currently spent and not on the sorts of projects that it is currently spent upon. That is, probably not allow politicians to spend the money.
That will disappoint vote seeking politicians of course. But there’s a theoretical (ie, not the correct amount of cynicism brought on by observation of the real world) reason, even series of reasons, why we might not want the private sector to be doing these things. The first and most obvious being that government borrowing costs are a great deal lower than private sector ones. That may or may not be a wash depending upon how more efficient the private sector is in the construction phase though.
The second and more theoretical again one is that governments take the public interest into account. In a manner that someone just running a road system, or a railway, won’t. Government is therefore able to allocate the socially optimal amount of capital to such things as infrastructure rather than the privately profitable amount that private sector actors would. And as a theory that’s just great. Which brings us back to our real world evidence from the wave of British privatisations of infrastructure.
We sold off all of the power companies and investment in the infrastructure of power generation and distribution rose. We sold off all the water companies and investment in the infrastructure of water and sewage services rose. We sold off all the railroads and investment in the railroads rose. Meaning that while government could, in theory, allocate the socially optimal amount of capital to these activities it probably didn’t. For we’re pretty much going to assume that the socially optimal amount is higher than the privately profitable: that’s what the theory assumes at least.
As to why government didn’t this brings us back to politicians and their incentives to spend money. Sure, new bridges are nice but nowhere near as good at gaining votes as a pay rise for the government workers, or an expansion of subsidised child care, or any of the other myriad things that politicians decide to provide us with our own money. And we actually have that UK example in front of us: when freed from the political process, from the allocation of capital by politicians, spending on infrastructure rose.
So, this brings us to a solution to America’s infrastructure woes that conservatives might be able to get behind and one that neoliberals like myself think would be a remarkably good idea. Sell it.
Just sell it all: the airports, the highways, the railroads, the water treatment plants, the lot. Past experience tells us that the private sector will, in defiance of theory, actually spend more on these things than budget constrained (ooops, sorry, vote buying politicians) governments will. As that’s what the liberals want, more infrastructure spending, they should be right behind this idea too. And as I say, we’ve that real world evidence that this works. For infrastructure investment did rise in the UK after privatisation.
Quite frankly it’s appallingly difficult to think of a reason why anyone at all might oppose this idea.